

Security risks report – Nigeria

November 2025

Executive summary

- In September 2025 there were several kidnapping incidents targeting Chinese workers in the mining and construction sectors.
 - On 6 September, gunmen attacked an NSCDC convoy in Edo State, killing eight guards and kidnapping five Chinese workers at a cement plant; four were later rescued.
 - On 20 September, a mining convoy in Kogi State was ambushed, resulting in the kidnapping of four Chinese workers and the death of one Nigerian soldier.
- Despite these incidents, most foreign kidnap victims in Nigeria are from neighbouring countries, lured by criminal gangs with false promises of visas to Western nations.
- Moreover, the vast majority of kidnapping victims are local nationals, predominantly in rural areas – for reference, incidents of mass kidnappings in villages are estimated to average around 22 per month, based on media reports.
 - A notable mass kidnapping involved over 100 people (mostly women and children) in Zamfara State, with attackers driving into a village on motorbikes and firing indiscriminately: as Convex has previously noted, this has become a standard modus operandi among bandit gangs.
- The bandit crisis has led to a loss of confidence in state security forces, prompting villagers to respond in a range of ways.
 - One has been to form vigilante groups, but more recently, local communities have increasingly attempted to negotiate peace deals with bandit groups.
- Local communities' attempts to fend for themselves reflect the lack of trust in the forces of law and order: the police service, in particular, has a bad reputation owing to the frequency with which officers are found to be involved in criminal activities.
 - Police extortion is especially prevalent, particularly on highways, where transporters face repeated illegal levies on their routes.
- More generally, police brutality and extortion remain significant issues despite an attempt at police reform in 2020.
 - Isolated disciplinary actions and investigations have not addressed systemic issues within the police force.
 - Convex notes that without comprehensive reform and improved oversight mechanisms, the cycle of abuse and public mistrust will likely continue, undermining the rule of law and broader security efforts.
- Recent counter-terrorist military operations have led to some victories against insurgents, including the killing and apprehension of Boko Haram members and the rescue of kidnapped victims.






Review of recent developments

- While foreign nationals are not normally the targets of kidnapping in Nigeria, in September 2025 there were two incidents targeting Chinese nationals working in the mining and construction sectors.
 - Convex has already noted in previous reports the vulnerability of expatriate workers sent to rural areas. A paramilitary force, the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), was established in 2003 with a mandate to protect infrastructure installations, among other duties. However, expatriates working on infrastructure remain attractive targets.
 - On 6 September in Edo State, gunmen attacked an NSCDC convoy, killing eight guards and kidnapping five Chinese workers at a cement plant. Four of them were rescued.
 - On 20 September, a mining convoy in Kogi State was ambushed by armed assailants and four Chinese workers were taken; one Nigerian soldier was killed.
- As Chinese investment in Nigeria is focused primarily on infrastructure, Chinese nationals are likely to become more frequent targets for kidnapping gangs owing to their greater chances of success in rural rather than urban areas.
- However, although the kidnapping of foreign nationals from non-African nations tends to make the news in Nigeria, most foreign victims are from neighbouring countries, lured to Nigeria by criminal gangs with the promise of visas to Western countries and other such inducements promising a better life.
 - One such cross-border gang was dismantled in October by Interpol Nigeria in collaboration with Interpol bureaus in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire.
 - This kidnapping and human trafficking ring operated across West Africa, with the criminals themselves being nationals from these countries. The gang drew victims to Nigeria by promising to secure them Canadian work visas.
- Despite these examples, the overwhelming majority of kidnap victims are local nationals, predominantly in rural areas. Moreover, as noted by Convex in previous reports, kidnappers make up for the lack of resources of any individual victim by taking hostages in large numbers.
 - While reporting on mass kidnappings is ad hoc and unlikely to be comprehensive or completely reliable, a survey of media reports of these incidents since 2023 suggests that these incidents may be averaging at around 22 per month.
 - The issue is most serious in North-Western Nigeria, especially in Zamfara, followed by Kaduna and Katsina States.
- One of the largest such events recently was the abduction of over 100 people, mostly women and children, in Zamfara State.
 - The modus operandi of the attackers was the by now standard approach, already reported by Convex, of riding into a village on motorbikes, firing indiscriminately at the inhabitants. A group is then taken at random.
- The bandit crisis has reached major proportions and has also led to a loss of confidence in the ability of the state security forces to put an end to the problem. This is leading villagers to take their own initiatives.
 - One response has been violent retaliation through vigilante groups, as Convex has described in previous reports.
- More recently, communities have been trying another approach. Since June there have been a number of meetings between groups of bandits and community representatives from different Local Government Authorities (LGAs) in Katsina to reach peace agreements, including a cessation of hostilities and a commitment to peaceful coexistence.
 - Some of these agreements have taken place under the aegis of the government's Operation Safe Corridor (OSC), launched in 2016 to reintegrate Islamist fighters into society (**see In focus: Operation Safe Corridor**).
 - Given the environmental factors driving banditry – including climate change, poverty, widespread gun availability and the activities of Islamist movements in the region – the longevity of these agreements is questionable. Nonetheless, they reflect communities' belief that the Nigerian state is unable to protect them.



- Lack of confidence in the state and its agencies is reinforced by the frequency with which police and other state security officers – for example, from the NSCDC – are caught perpetrating crimes themselves, most notably extortion.
- Extortion by law enforcement and the security agencies is most visible on the highways. Vehicles transporting perishable foodstuffs, in particular, have to deal with repeated illegal levies at checkpoints. Part of the threat is that, if drivers refuse to pay on the spot, they risk being taken to an office and charged an even higher “toll”.
 - These illegal payment demands are effectively a hidden tax on produce, and contribute to double-digit food price inflation.
 - An unintended consequence is a degradation in road safety. Many drivers, believing that they will be “fined” whether they are in violation of road regulations or not, end up deciding that there is no point incurring the costs of compliance and roadworthiness.
- Transporters are not the only ones facing vehicle stop-and-search operations; checkpoints are a problem for citizens across the board.
 - On 3 August 2025, near Benin City (Edo State), six police officers allegedly stopped members of the National Association of Seadogs (NAS, a student confraternity) at a checkpoint, and extorted NGN2m (USD1,369) from one of them via a point-of-sale (POS) machine – in itself suggesting the officers’ level of preparation and the routine nature of the process for them. The officers also seized personal items. The Edo State police department addressed the matter swiftly, recovering the items and taking disciplinary action against the officer.
 - Also in early August, in Kwara State, police officers stopped a student from the Offa Federal Polytechnic in his vehicle and demanded that he unlock his phone. When the student refused, they took him to a police station, but he continued to refuse. Allegedly, the officers then transferred the case to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in Ilorin (capital city of Kwara State), whereupon the student was finally successfully coerced into transferring NGN200,000 (USD137) into a private bank account. The Kwara State police commissioner ordered the immediate arrest and trial of the officers accused of the crime.
- Police extortion is often accompanied by violence, and indeed, the police service generally has a history of brutality. In 2020, this triggered the so-called #EndSARS mass protest movement, which called for the disbandment of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), a notoriously brutal unit. The movement resulted in the passage of the Police Act 2020, to replace the colonial-era Police Act of 1943. However, police reform has failed to eradicate the problem.
 - In August, an individual accused police officers in Lagos of abducting him from his home and driving him to a police building – he reportedly shared a video of the incident. The officers allegedly beat him repeatedly and forced him to sign a false confession to internet fraud; they then demanded payment of NGN2m, also using a POS machine to transfer the funds. Reportedly, the victim did not have the full amount and had to borrow the balance. An investigation was launched into the allegations.
 - Also in August, a police officer and three civilians were arrested on charges of brutality, harassment, extortion and armed robbery. The four individuals had been allegedly terrorising and extorting residents of Benin City, and were arrested after a video showing them abducting a victim and seizing his belongings went viral on social media.
- Police reform has stalled as a result of perennial underfunding, but also a culture within the police heavily based on political patronage and bribery, which fosters corrupt networks. The underfunding also means that accountability is weak, as the organs supposed to monitor police behaviour are neither properly staffed nor independent.
- While isolated disciplinary actions and high-profile investigations occasionally occur, these efforts have not been sufficient to address the systemic issues underpinning police brutality and extortion. Without comprehensive reform, improved oversight mechanisms, and a genuine shift in institutional culture, the cycle of abuse and public mistrust is likely to continue, undermining both the rule of law and broader efforts to improve security across the country.






In focus: Operation Safe Corridor

- Operation Safe Corridor (OSC) was established in 2016 by the Nigerian government as part of a wider counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency strategy.
 - OSC's founding purpose was to complement military operations against Boko Haram and its splinter ISWAP (see Islamist groups), on the basis that purely military responses were insufficient to defeat insurgency.
 - The thinking was that many lower-level recruits, defectors, or people coerced into extremism could be rehabilitated, deradicalised, and reintegrated into society.
- Over time, the program has expanded beyond the North-East (where Boko Haram is most active) into other regions facing banditry and criminal violence. In early 2025, OSC's remit was expanded to the North-West, with Zamfara State becoming OSC regional headquarters in that zone.
- The OSC programme is based on five pillars: disarmament, demobilisation, deradicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration. Fighters are sent to camps to be re-educated and to be taught skills with which to rebuild a life outside combat.
- However, although OSC has rehabilitated many individuals, providing non-military alternatives for some fighters, progress has been piecemeal – unsurprisingly, given the scale of resources required.
 - According to the government, as of August 2025, OSC had rehabilitated over 2,600 surrendered combatants from Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.
 - While these are positive results, they are a drop in the ocean compared with the total number of Islamist fighters and bandits. While estimates vary widely and cannot be considered reliable, for reference, a 2024 estimate for the number of bandits put them at around 30,000, while Islamist fighters are thought to total some 7,000 between Boko Haram and ISWAP.
- Additionally, the sustainability of results depends heavily on community buy-in, economic opportunity, robust monitoring, and an updated methodology, especially when dealing with non-ideological criminal violence, as in the North-West.
 - In particular, there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that reintegrated individuals can often face ostracism or mistrust from their local communities.
 - This is entwined with concerns of recidivism when reintegration fails, which in turn strengthens communities' belief that the "rehabilitated" individuals cannot be trusted.
 - The extent to which these concerns are a serious issue is unknown, as there is insufficient post-programme monitoring and evaluation of outcomes beyond individuals' immediate reintegration.

US State Department advice

The US State Department ranks Nigeria overall at Level 3: Reconsider Travel. The risks listed are crime, terrorism, civil unrest, kidnapping, armed gangs and health. The list of states classed at Level 4: Do Not Travel is as follows:



Convex notes the need for security awareness when travelling in the FCT, even if the territory is not included in the Do Not Travel list issued by the US State Department. Travelling in some suburban areas of Lagos State also warrants caution.

Groups engaged in kidnap and extortion

Petty criminals and criminal groups

- Kidnapping, extortion and financial scams are widespread in Nigeria, carried out at all levels from petty criminals – street youths and gangs – to larger, more organised groups. The victims of these crimes will vary depending on the reach and resources of the perpetrators involved (see **Targets**), but the overall effect is to make Nigeria one of the countries with the highest security risk in the world.
- Autonomous, opportunistic armed groups – referred to interchangeably as **bandits** or **militias** – carry out a wide range of crimes, with kidnapping for ransom and extortion being two of their most common activities.
- While armed banditry is endemic in Nigeria, it is especially prevalent in the North-West; Zamfara State is seen as the historical epicentre of the current banditry and has the highest incidence of kidnapping in the country, followed by Kaduna and Niger states, respectively.
- Marine piracy and kidnapping of cargo – mainly oil cargo – is another lucrative revenue stream for criminal groups in the Niger Delta.
 - The groups involved are experienced and professional in terms of their modus operandi, meaning their financial expectations – and therefore the average demands, settlements and durations in such cases are higher and longer.
 - The scale of the resources required to conduct these operations – including oil tankers to transport the cargo to Europe – suggests that powerful political figures must be involved.

Ethnic groups

The territory of Nigeria is home to hundreds of ethnic groups, the smallest reported number being 250. Most of these groups are very small. The three largest ethnic groups by population are the **Hausa-Fulani**, who are Muslim and based mainly across the North of the country, and the **Yoruba** and **Igbo** (or Ibo) in the South – both Christian.

- The disparity in religious affiliation between ethnic groups means that interethnic conflict often overlaps with religious conflict. An additional dimension is that, historically, the Fulani are nomadic pastoralists, whereas the Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba are settled farmers.
- There has been a resurgence of an Igbo-led Biafran separatist movement in the Niger Delta, composed of two main groups: the **Indigenous People of Biafra** (IPOB) and the **Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra** (MASSOB). IPOB is the most recent of the two, and the most violent; it was founded in 2012, and in 2020 its leader, Nnamdi Kanu (currently in prison), founded the **Eastern Security Network** (ESN) as a militant fighting wing of the organisation.
- Herder-farmer conflict in Nigeria, which has a long history, is mainly attributed to so-called **Fulani militias**; some Nigerian media observers talk about a single Fulani militia, but there is little evidence of the existence of a single, centrally organised group.

Current state of play

- Banditry is spreading across the North and creeping down towards the FCT, endangering the federal capital, Abuja. Residential estates in the suburbs of Abuja are becoming increasingly frequent targets for gangs based in Kaduna State.
- The distinction between pure banditry and attacks motivated by ethnic conflicts or religious affiliation has become extremely blurred, and indeed none of the most high-profile attacks appear to have been perpetrated by groups with any specific affiliation.
 - Surveys of internal refugee camps in April 2024 showed that the most frequent reason given for displacement by far (45% of those surveyed) was banditry and kidnapping, followed by farmer-herder clashes (36%).
- The lack of a strong correlation between banditry and Islamist violence was shown in an attack on a mosque in Katsina on 19 August 2025. At least 17 people died. The attack was deemed to be a reprisal for an incident two days earlier, when local residents ambushed and killed a number of bandits.





Islamist groups

Three prominent militant Islamist groups operate in Nigeria, historically concentrated in the North-East of the country, around Lake Chad.

- **Boko Haram** (Jama'atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad – People Committed to the Prophet's Teachings for Propagation and Jihad) emerged in 2002 and was originally affiliated with Al-Qaida. From 2009 it was led by Abubakar Shekau and gained international notoriety for its large-scale and indiscriminate attacks on both government and civilian targets – most notably the abduction of around 300 schoolgirls in April 2014. Shekau killed himself in 2021 during a battle with ISWAP that Boko Haram was losing.
- **Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)** is the offshoot of a splinter within Boko Haram. In 2015, Shekau publicly pledged Boko Haram's allegiance to Islamic State (IS) and renamed his group ISWAP. However, IS recognised Habib Yusuf – a rival leading figure in Boko Haram, also known as Abu Musab al-Barnawi – as wali (leader) of ISWAP instead of Shekau, reportedly owing to the latter's willingness to attack Muslims. Shekau and his followers abandoned ISWAP and went back to using the Boko Haram name.
- **Ansaru** (Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan – Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa) announced its formation in 2012. The group broke off from Boko Haram after Shekau ordered a large-scale attack in which 200 civilians, mostly Muslim, were killed. Ansaru carried out several high-profile attacks in 2012-13; however, the group was under constant attack from Shekau's Boko Haram. Weakened, it seemingly lay dormant until 2020, when they claimed the killing of six soldiers in an ambush in Kaduna State. Since then, the group has officially declared its allegiance to and common purpose with Al-Qaida.

Boko Haram and **ISWAP** are both based in Borno State, North-East Nigeria, where they have been fighting each other for control. Borno State is strategically important because it allows for the conduct of operations in Chad, Cameroon and Niger.

Since the military takeover in Niger, joint efforts to patrol the Niger-Nigeria border have collapsed, and Nigeria is thus facing an increased risk that Islamist groups operating in Niger and Mali will establish a strong presence in north-western Nigeria.

- One such group is the so-called **Lakurawa**. This group had come to the attention of the authorities in 2018, but was dismissed as herders from Mali straying occasionally into Sokoto State. Reports of its origins vary, making it unclear whether its members were indeed just herders or Islamist militias right from the start. While there is a consensus that Lakurawa originated in Mali and Niger, some sources link the group to the broader Islamic State network, whereas others link them to Al-Qaida. The likelihood is that the group contains a mix of fighters from different structures.
- Another leading group is **Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen** (Group for Support of Islam and Muslims – JNIM), a conglomeration of Al-Qaida-affiliated groups operating in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Since its foundation in 2017, JNIM has been consolidating its chain of command and tightening control over its territory.
- Another such group is JNIM's main rival, **Islamic State Sahel (IS Sahel)** – also known as **Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS)**. IS Sahel was established in 2015 and, in 2019-22, operated as a branch of ISWAP before branching out on its own. JNIM and IS Sahel have been engaged in a turf war since 2018, although the entry of the Russian Wagner Group into West Africa has caused them to redirect their military efforts towards it instead.
- Reports also emerged in May 2025 of another Islamist group known as **Mahmuda** – or also **Mallam Group**, after its leader. As with Lakurawa, this group is thought to have existed under the radar for five years, and to be a splinter of Boko Haram.



- Nassawara State Governor Abdullahi Sule claimed on 14 October 2025 that a new Boko Haram splinter, **Wulowulo**, was beginning to surface in the North-Central zone. However, all mentions of this group in open sources can be traced back to the governor's statement; there appears to be no other corroborating information on this alleged group.

All Islamist groups engage in violent terrorist activities and kidnapping – whether it be to wrest political concessions from the government or as a source of funds. To finance their operations these groups also rely on extortion, which they present as Zakat – a religious obligation in Islam to donate a proportion of one's income.

Current state of play

- **Boko Haram** is thought to have been weakened by its struggle for influence with **ISWAP**, but nonetheless, in 2025 it has staged a series of attacks in Borno State. There are no reliable estimates as to the current size of the organisation, but there is anecdotal evidence that the group is renewing efforts to replenish its ranks.
 - According to humanitarian organisations, **Boko Haram** is destroying crops and farming infrastructure to create food shortages, then using that hardship as leverage to recruit children and teenagers in exchange for food.
 - This appears to be a key strategy to replenish its ranks, as the organisation has suffered significant losses in recent years owing to increased pressure from the military and the ongoing war with ISWAP.

- The increased scale of military operations since the start of 2025 nevertheless appears to have had an impact, as there were no high-profile attacks by Islamist groups between July and mid-October.
- Instead, the military has scored a few notable victories, the most recent of which was an operation carried out between 10-13 October, during which four insurgents were killed and another 53 apprehended. The operation also led to the rescue of nine kidnapped victims.
 - Earlier, on 3 September, the Nigerian Air Force struck Boko Haram camps in the Sambisa Forest (Borno State), killing some 15 members of the organisation.





Kidnapping and extortion: overview



Perpetrators

- Armed bandit groups across the country and petty criminals are the main perpetrators of kidnap strictly for ransom. Extortion is another key source of revenue for both these groups.
- High inflation and rising poverty are fuelling abduction rates, driving increasing numbers of predominantly young men to resort to kidnapping.
- Since around 2020, there has been a surge in kidnap for ransom by herdsmen.
- Religious groups engage in kidnapping for both financial and political purposes. This is especially true when groups lose control of territory, as ransoms replace the lost revenue derived from controlling villages and farms.
- Extortion by police officers and other state security agents is also a widespread problem.



Targets

- Victims of kidnap for ransom are overwhelmingly local inhabitants, especially in rural areas where mass kidnappings have become the norm.
- Foreigners are estimated to account for only around 1% of cases, according to various non-official sources and Convex's own estimates.
- Foreigners are targets of kidnap-for-ransom mainly in the oil-rich Niger Delta. However, in less developed areas of the country, foreigners working at mining sites or for non-governmental organisations (NGO) can also be targets of kidnapping – the latter not only for ransom but also for political reasons.
- Extortion targets vary depending on the perpetrators. The transport sector is specifically vulnerable to police extortion, with truck drivers being routinely stopped at checkpoints and forced to pay arbitrary “tolls”.



Statistics

- Crime statistics made available by the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) on its website are not comprehensive or up to date.
- A public domain source often used in reports of crime in Nigeria is the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), a US-based NGO.
- The data available suffer from limitations and almost certainly fail to reflect real levels; for example, many instances of kidnapping happen in rural areas and are not reported.

If you would like to discuss this or how Convex Crisis Response can support you, contact your broker, agent or Convex Crisis Response on:
crisisresponsemanagement@convexin.com



Principles of security

There are seven fundamental principles of security:




Layers of security



Planning



Communication



Situational awareness



Profile



Routine



Information security

These principles are applicable in any environment, however they are most relevant in unfamiliar surroundings or in areas with high levels of crime, terrorism or civil unrest. In terms of kidnap prevention, experience shows that given the relatively opportunistic nature of many kidnaps adherence to these principles can reduce the likelihood of someone becoming a victim of kidnapping.

- **Layers of security:** there is no single measure that enhances personal security, instead the focus should always be on applying several layers of mitigation involving physical, procedural and behavioural measures, as well as adopting a generally proactive attitude towards security.
- **Planning:** individuals can reduce risk simply by making an effort to understand the general security environment in their location and then pre planning appropriate security precautions (for example insurance, airport pick-ups, security escorts and/or other local support).
- **Communications:** identifying in advance key points of contact in emergencies (for example local office, hotel, police, embassy, security providers) and have a back-up method of communications in the event a phone does not work locally for network or other reasons. In higher threat environments share itineraries with others in advance and consider establishing lost contact plans involving periodic 'check ins'.
- **Situational awareness:** being aware of your general surroundings at all times but particularly with regards regular routines (for example arriving or leaving at home, the office, schools, or restaurants or shopping malls). Be aware of higher risk areas along routes you travel and be alert to unusual or suspicious incidents, behaviours, people or other occurrences in your vicinity. Avoid situations where you could become isolated and, above all, always trust your instincts.
- **Profile:** kidnappers – and criminals in general – normally target their victims because that individual has come to their attention for some reason. It is therefore important that individuals adopt a low profile in high kidnap threat environments. This should involve minimising overt displays of wealth, not unnecessarily sharing unnecessarily details of itineraries or business trips, and ensuring personal information such as home addresses, phone numbers and email address and family information are not easily accessible.
- **Routines:** kidnappers are most easily able to target and abduct victims who have a predictable routine. It is important therefore in higher threat kidnap environments to avoid setting predictable patterns of behaviour, particularly regarding places you regularly visit. Most kidnaps occur at the beginning or end of journeys, so it is critical to be alert during these phases.
- **Information security:** to reduce vulnerability to both kidnapping but also extortion it is important individuals and their families regularly undertake periodic reviews of their online profiles – including all corporate and social media – to enable an assessment of what personal information is easily accessible and could be utilised by criminals.

Kidnap and Extortion

INITIAL ACTIONS

IF YOU SUSPECT YOU ARE THE VICTIM OF A KIDNAP OR THREAT EXTORTION

DO

- ✓ Start a log of calls, events and any actions taken
- ✓ Form a small family crisis cell / company crisis team
- ✓ Preserve any physical evidence carefully (e.g. letters or parcels received)
- ✓ If possible record any telecommunications with the kidnapper/extortionist, or carefully note all details of what is said
- ✓ Note details of all demands, deadlines or threats received
- ✓ **If you are a Convex client call the 24/7 Response Helpline and ask to speak to the Convex Crisis Response Duty officer**

DON'T

- ✗ Agree to anything, make any offer or start negotiating
- ✗ Acknowledge, agree to or self-impose any deadlines (e.g. "I can get that for you in an hour")
- ✗ Discuss the incident with anyone who does not need to know about it or, if it is not yet publicly known, report the incident without first receiving advice
- ✗ Make any decisions until advised by Convex Crisis Response.

If a kidnapping

Prepare for a possible first call from the kidnappers by:

- Identifying someone (not a decision maker) to act as a 'Communicator' to speak on behalf of the family/company
- Identifying anyone who could potentially receive a call from kidnappers and brief them on how to respond if they are contacted (to say and promise nothing and direct the caller to the Communicator's number).

If communication from someone claiming to hold the victim is received the Communicator should:

- Listen carefully to what is said and ask the caller to repeat anything that is unclear
- Reassure the caller you wish to cooperate
- Explain that you are not authorized to make any decisions as you have to consult other family or company members
- Ask to speak with the victim to confirm that they are alive and well, or ask for other evidence of their well-being (e.g. the answer to a question that only the victim(s) can answer)
- If you do speak with the victim(s) reassure them you are doing everything you can to secure their release and that their family(s) are being looked after
- Stay calm in the face of threats, these are normal, but challenge threats of violence towards the victim(s) (e.g. 'We want to resolve this without anyone getting hurt')
- If possible arrange a time for a call back
- Stall for time pending the arrival of the Convex Crisis Response consultant.



REMEMBER

If in doubt call the Convex Crisis Response Helpline – we would rather help you prevent an incident than help you respond to one.





Convex Insurance UK Limited

52 Lime Street, London EC3M 7AF
+44 (0)20 3886 0560

Convex Re Limited

Point House, 6 Front Street, Hamilton HM 11, Bermuda
+1 441 232 0112

Convex Europe S.A.

37 Boulevard Joseph II, 2ème étage,
L-1840 Luxembourg, Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg
+352 27 86 22 76

Convex Guernsey Limited

Bucktrout House, Glatigny Esplanade, St Peter Port, Guernsey, GY1 1WR

convexin.com

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