

Security Risks Report – Nigeria

May 2025

Executive summary

Nigeria has been experiencing an escalating tide of insecurity, marked by daily violent incidents, although official statistics for 2025 are not yet available. Despite the absence of current data, the risk of kidnapping remains exceedingly high.

- Kidnapping incidents continue to predominantly affect local nationals in violence-prone areas, but foreigners and notable individuals are also at risk.

For instance, on 26 January, Rauf Adeniji, a senior member of Tinubu's All Progressives Congress (APC) party, was kidnapped along with two relatives.

- The incident took place in the Bwari Council Area of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), an area previously highlighted by Convex as increasingly subject to kidnap risk.
- Reportedly, the kidnappers tricked Adeniji into letting them into his home. By the time the cousin was rescued on 8 April, it was revealed that Adeniji had died shortly after being taken.

Foreigners are also vulnerable to kidnappings in Nigeria, as demonstrated by the abduction of an Israeli tourist in Taraba State on 3 April; he was rescued on 6 April with the involvement of the Israeli Foreign Ministry.

The Catholic Church has been notably targeted, with at least seven priests kidnapped by 10 March 2025, not without fatalities.

- The lack of comprehensive, reliable reporting on kidnap incidents (especially as most go unreported) make it difficult to determine whether these abductions are financially or religiously motivated.

Risk incident databases indicate a reduction in mass abductions compared to last year, suggesting a possible resurgence of farmer-herder conflicts as opposed to attacks driven by pure financial gain.

- This resurgence is exemplified by attacks in six villages in Bokkos Local Government Area (LGA), Plateau State, resulting in 52 deaths and 2000 displaced individuals.
- Further attacks in Bassa LGA on 13 April led to 54 additional fatalities.

The federal government's stretched military resources are a significant concern, exacerbated by the explosion at the Trans-Niger Pipeline (TNP) in Rivers State on 17 March.

- President Tinubu declared six months of emergency rule in Rivers State, appointing a retired vice-admiral as head of state administration, which critics argue prioritizes oil security over citizen protection.
- Nigeria's reliance on oil revenue, constituting 80-90% of export receipts, underscores the importance of pipeline security, especially with oil prices forecasted below the government's budget assumptions.

The formation of vigilante groups is becoming an increasingly widespread response to the government's perceived inability to combat armed groups, further contributing to the violence.

- Vigilantes often act without due process, leading to incidents such as the killing of 16 hunters mistaken for criminals in Edo State on 27 March.
- The proliferation of vigilante groups increases the risk of exacerbating ethnic and religious tensions, complicating governance and intensifying the partisan political environment.

Nigeria's security challenges are thus compounded by a stretched military, a declining trust in the federal government, and the rise of vigilante groups. These factors collectively contribute to a volatile situation, making effective governance increasingly difficult.

The involvement of villagers in armed self-defence efforts, in particular, raises the risk of escalating pre-existing ethnic and religious tensions.

- This cycle of retaliation can exacerbate local conflicts and intensify an already highly partisan political environment.





Review of recent developments

The rising tide of insecurity continues unabated in Nigeria, as evidenced by daily reports of a wide range of violent incidents even if official statistics are as yet unavailable for 2025.

While the lack of current reliable statistics makes it difficult to parse out kidnap risk from security risk more broadly and to identify trends, kidnap risk nonetheless remains very high.

Even if the majority of kidnap victims are local nationals, predominantly in the areas most affected by violence, there are notable exceptions to show that anybody can be at risk.

- On 26 January Rauf Adeniji, a senior member of Tinubu's All Progressives Congress (APC), was kidnapped along with his cousin and his cousin's wife in the Bwari Council Area of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT).
- Convex has already noted in previous reports the rising risk of kidnapping in the FCT (see **US Travel Advisory**), especially around Bwari.
- According to unconfirmed media articles purportedly quoting sources close to the victims, the kidnappers tricked Adeniji into letting them into his home and killed his cousin's wife during the abduction.
- The ransom demand was reportedly NGN250m (USD16m). As always, the federal government said it would not be paid.
- The cousin and wife were reportedly rescued on 8 April, at which point it became known that Adeniji had died shortly after he was taken.

Similarly, foreigners can also fall prey to kidnappers. On 3 April an Israeli tourist was kidnapped in Taraba State, in North East Nigeria. No details of the case emerged, other than the Israeli Foreign Ministry's participation in the rescue operation, which took place on 6 April.

- The speed at which the tourist was rescued, compared with the three months it took to rescue Adeniji's cousin, suggests that foreign intervention was key to a speedy resolution of the case.

Despite the wide range of potential victims of kidnap for ransom, one specific target that Convex has noted in previous reports is the Catholic Church, which in 2025 continued to suffer abductions.

- According to the Nigerian Catholic press, by 10 March at least seven priests had been kidnapped in Nigeria, not without loss of life.
- In one instance, a priest was kidnapped and found dead the following day.
- The lack of reliable reporting on ransom payments makes it difficult to assess whether the Catholic Church is being targeted solely for monetary reasons or whether there are also – as the Church claims – religious motivations behind some of the abductions.

The Catholic Church also shares the broader lack of confidence in the federal government, fuelled by the already noted lack of discrimination in the military response to the wave of violence.

- On 17 January air strikes on a predominantly Christian area in Adamawa State resulted in the death of some 80 Christians who, according to the official statement released later, had been mistaken for Boko Haram militants.

Against these reports of individual instances of kidnap for ransom, risk incident databases compiled by organisations such as ACLED (see **Statistics**) do not show the same level of high-volume abductions as in 2024.

In 2023-24 there was a significant increase in attacks carried out to kidnap a large group of people – among poor communities, obtaining small ransoms from many individuals is a better strategy than hoping for a large ransom from one individual.

- As Convex has noted in previous reports, in Nigeria the Fulani ethnic group, who are mostly pastoralist and Muslim, are routinely blamed for any attacks on villages that are not clearly the work of Islamist groups (see **Ethnic groups**).
- However, these mass kidnappings were clearly for ransom, suggesting they were outside the framework of traditional farmer-herder conflicts.
- By contrast, if the absence of reports of mass abductions in 2025 is correct, this could suggest that conflict *per se* between herders and settled farming populations has resurged in recent months.

In early April, for example, six villages in Bokkos Local Government Area (LGA), Plateau State, experienced a series of attacks by armed groups that resulted in at least 52 dead and some 2000 people displaced.

- This was the worst spate of attacks in Plateau State since December 2023, when another outbreak of large-scale violence in the same district left some 200 people dead.
- Bokkos LGA was not, however, the only target of attacks: on the night of 13 April gunmen razed several houses in a village in Kwall LGA to the ground, killing at least another 54 people.
- According to state governor Caleb Mufwang, “bandits” (as armed groups are known when the Fulani are not directly accused) have taken over no fewer than 64 villages in the Bokkos, Barkin Ladi and Riyom districts. All these districts border on Kaduna State, a historical epicentre of conflict between herders and farmers.

The attacks listed above were not the only ones that took place at the start of 2025 in Plateau State, or indeed in the country as a whole. Conflict escalated in several other states, with especially violent clashes in Benue State and Borno State.

- In one particularly protracted attack, an armed group laid siege to a village in Benue State for four days.



Also seemingly in resurgence is the conflict between state forces and Islamist groups, namely Boko Haram and ISWAP (see **Islamist groups**). Both sides have escalated their use of weaponry: on the Islamists' side, the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) is becoming more commonplace, while the government's main strategy now consists of aerial drone attacks.

- These aerial attacks are not, however, bearing clear results, and indeed could be making the situation in conflict-torn areas worse owing to the lack of precision with which strikes are often carried out, as Convex has already noted in previous reports.
- The lack of visible results has also caused friction between the federal government and states' governments. Both levels accuse each other of not doing enough to combat armed groups.

A key issue is that Nigeria's military is stretched, fighting wars across several fronts. This problem was exacerbated after an explosion at the Trans-Niger Pipeline (TNP), one of Nigeria's largest, in Rivers State on 17 March (see **In focus: Rivers State**).

- In response to the explosion of the TNP, Tinubu declared six months of emergency rule in the state – that is, direct rule by the federal government – and the deployment of military resources to secure the pipeline.

While the government struggles to put out a myriad of fires, loss of confidence in the federal government is not limited to state governors but also affects the broader population. One response that is becoming increasingly widespread is the formation of vigilante groups, which itself is adding to the violence.

- Most vigilante groups arise organically in small communities seeking to defend themselves, but some vigilante groups operate under the aegis of state-level administrations.
- Illustrating the potential for confusion and further conflict that this proliferation of militias is likely to cause over the long term, in 2025 there have been several instances where the Nigerian Air Force mistakenly hit vigilante groups.
- In one air strike in January, the vigilantes were confused from the air with the bandits they were chasing.

Vigilante groups also act without due process and with minimal information.

- On 27 March a vigilante group in Edo State stopped a truck carrying a group of young men and beat 16 of them to death, based on the fact that the men in the truck had rifles with them and were thus thought to be criminals.
- As it turned out, the men were hunters from Kano State returning home from the hunt. According to the few survivors, they had shown the vigilantes their gun licences, but that did not stop the attack.

With villagers taking up arms to defend themselves without much prior investigation, the risk is that pre-existing ethnic and religious tensions will escalate even further in a vicious cycle of retaliation. Once exacerbated, these local tensions can make governance difficult and aggravate an already highly partisan political environment.



In focus: Rivers State

Rivers State has been for some months in the grip of a political dispute between its governor, Siminalayi Fubara, and a faction of its parliament supporting Fubara's predecessor and rival, Nyesom Wike.

- According to Tinubu, this political conflict has adversely affected governance in the state and is to blame for an increase in violence and acts of vandalism in the state.

Tinubu appointed a retired vice-admiral of the Nigerian Navy as head of the state administration, effectively putting Rivers State under military control.

- The military resources sent to Rivers State – instead of being deployed to fight banditry and terrorism, arguably – have been seen by Tinubu's critics and opponents as a sign that the president cares more about securing the flow of oil than protecting people.

At stake is Nigeria's reliance on oil revenue, which accounts for some 80-90% of export receipts. While the controversial tariff policies of US President Donald Trump are likely to have a minimal impact on Nigeria (which would have a tariff of 14%), oil prices are an important bellwether for the Nigerian economy.

The government's current budget assumes oil prices above USD75 per barrel, significantly above an 8 April US Energy Information Administration (EIA) Dated Brent forecast of USD68 per barrel; Convex notes that Dated Brent was below USD65 per barrel at the time of writing this report.

With oil prices hit by global uncertainty, Nigeria needs to make up the loss through export volumes, which in turn rely in large part on the TNP operating at full capacity.

While the single incident in March did not derail oil transit for long, protecting the pipeline from further incidents is essential.


In 2023 the government launched a new strategy for the Niger Delta consisting of giving former militant groups pipeline security contracts, thereby turning them from poachers to gamekeepers.

- The fact that, at the time of writing this report, no group had claimed responsibility for the explosion could be seen as a sign that the strategy continues to work.
- However, the issue now is not that militant groups are targeting the state, but rather that they are fighting each other over the pipeline contracts.
- While some of that conflict is taking place in the courts, the risk is that the attack on the pipeline was a part of these turf wars and there could be others.



US State Department advice

The US State Department ranks Nigeria overall at *Level 3: Reconsider Travel*. The risks listed are crime, terrorism, civil unrest, kidnapping and armed gangs. The list of states classed at *Level 4: Do Not Travel* is as follows:



Given the rising incidence of kidnappings in Abuja's suburbs, Convex also notes the need for caution when travelling in the FCT, even if the territory is not included in the *Do Not Travel* list issued by the US State Department.

Groups engaged in kidnap and extortion

Petty criminals and criminal groups

- Kidnapping, extortion and financial scams are widespread in Nigeria, carried out at all levels from petty criminals – street youths and gangs – to larger, more organised groups. The victims of these crimes will vary depending on the reach and resources of the perpetrators involved (see **Targets**), but the overall effect is to make Nigeria one of the countries with the highest security risk in the world.
- Autonomous, opportunistic armed groups – referred to interchangeably as **bandits** or **militias** – carry out a wide range of crimes, with kidnapping for ransom and extortion being two of their most common activities.
- While armed banditry is endemic in Nigeria, it is especially prevalent in the North-West; Zamfara State is seen as the historical epicentre of the current banditry and has the highest incidence of kidnapping in the country, followed by Kaduna and Niger states, respectively.
- Marine piracy and kidnapping of cargo – mainly oil cargo – is another lucrative revenue stream for criminal groups in the Niger Delta.
 - The groups involved are experienced and professional in terms of their *modus operandi*, meaning their financial expectations – and therefore the average demands, settlements and durations in such cases are higher and longer.
 - The scale of the resources required to conduct these operations – including oil tankers to transport the cargo to Europe – suggests that powerful political figures must be involved.


Ethnic groups

The territory of Nigeria is home to hundreds of ethnic groups, the smallest reported number being 250. Most of these groups are very small. The three largest ethnic groups by population are the **Hausa-Fulani**, who are Muslim and based mainly across the North of the country, and the **Yoruba** and **Igbo** (or Ibo) in the South – both Christian.

- The disparity in religious affiliation between ethnic groups means that interethnic conflict often overlaps with religious conflict. An additional dimension is that, historically, the Fulani are nomadic pastoralists whereas the Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba are settled farmers.
- There has been a resurgence of an Igbo-led Biafran separatist movement in the Niger Delta, composed of two main groups: the **Indigenous People of Biafra** (IPOB); and the **Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra** (MASSOB). IPOB is the most recent of the two, and the most violent; it was founded in 2012 and in 2020 its leader, Nnamdi Kanu (currently in prison), founded the **Eastern Security Network** (ESN) as a militant fighting wing of the organisation.
- Herder-farmer conflict in Nigeria, which has a long history, is mainly attributed to so-called **Fulani militias**; some Nigerian media observers talk about a single Fulani militia, but there is little evidence of the existence of a single, centrally organised group.

Current state of play

- Banditry is spreading across the North and creeping down towards the FCT, endangering the federal capital, Abuja. Residential estates in the suburbs of Abuja are becoming increasingly frequent targets for gangs based in Kaduna State.
- There are some indications that the bandits are becoming more violent in their approach, using the same brute force employed in mass kidnappings to carry out the abductions of one or two individuals.
- The distinction between pure banditry and attacks motivated by ethnic conflicts or religious affiliation has become extremely blurred, and indeed none of the most high-profile incidents of mass kidnapping appear to have been perpetrated by groups with any specific affiliation. The traditional conflict between herders and farmers is thus giving way to outright violence and banditry with no motivation other than the pursuit of ransoms.
 - Surveys of internal refugee camps in April 2024 showed that the most frequent reason given for displacement by far (45% of those surveyed) was banditry and kidnapping, followed by farmer-herder clashes (36%).



Islamist groups

Three prominent militant Islamist groups operate in Nigeria, historically concentrated in the North-East of the country, around Lake Chad.

- **Boko Haram** (*Jama'atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad* – People Committed to the Prophet's Teachings for Propagation and Jihad) emerged in 2002 and was originally affiliated with Al-Qaida. From 2009 it was led by Abubakar Shekau and gained international notoriety for its large-scale and indiscriminate attacks on both government and civilian targets – most notably the abduction of around 300 schoolgirls in April 2014. Shekau killed himself in 2021 during a battle with ISWAP that Boko Haram was losing.
- **Islamic State West Africa Province** (ISWAP) is the offshoot of a splinter within Boko Haram. In 2015 Shekau publicly pledged Boko Haram's allegiance to Islamic State (IS) and renamed his group ISWAP. However, IS recognised Habib Yusuf – a rival leading figure in Boko Haram also known as Abu Musab al-Barnawi – as *wali* (leader) of ISWAP instead of Shekau, reportedly owing to the latter's willingness to attack Muslims. Shekau and his followers abandoned ISWAP and went back to using the Boko Haram name.
- **Ansaru** (*Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan* – Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa) announced its formation in 2012. The group broke off from Boko Haram after Shekau ordered a large-scale attack in which 200 civilians, mostly Muslim, were killed. Ansaru carried out several high-profile attacks in 2012-13; however, the group was under constant attack from Shekau's Boko Haram. Weakened, it seemingly lay dormant until 2020, when they claimed the killing of six soldiers in an ambush in Kaduna State. Since then, the group has officially declared its allegiance to and common purpose with Al-Qaida.

Since the military takeover in Niger, joint efforts to patrol the Niger-Nigeria border have collapsed and Nigeria is thus facing an increased risk that Islamist groups operating in Niger and Mali will establish a strong presence in north-western Nigeria.

- One group that has risen to prominence is the so-called **Lakurawa**. This group had come to the attention of the authorities in 2018 but was dismissed as herders from Mali straying occasionally into Sokoto State. Reports of its origins vary, making it unclear whether its members were indeed just herders or Islamist militias right from the start. While there is a consensus that Lakurawa originated in Mali and Niger, some sources link the group to the broader Islamic State network, whereas others link them to Al-Qaida. The likelihood is that the group contains a mix of fighters from different structures.
- Another leading group is **Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen** (Group for Support of Islam and Muslims – JNIM), a conglomeration of Al-Qaida affiliated groups operating in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Since its foundation in 2017, JNIM has been consolidating its chain of command and tightening control over its territory.
- Another such group is JNIM's main rival, **Islamic State Sahel** (IS Sahel) – also known as **Islamic State in the Greater Sahara** (ISGS). IS Sahel was established in 2015 and in 2019-22 operated as a branch of ISWAP before branching out on its own. JNIM and IS Sahel have been engaged in a turf war since 2018, although the entry of the Russian Wagner Group into West Africa has caused them to redirect their military efforts towards it instead.

All Islamist groups engage in violent terrorist activities and kidnapping – whether it be to wrest political concessions from the government or as a source of funds. To finance their operations these groups also rely on extortion, which they present as *Zakat* – a religious obligation in Islam to donate a proportion of one's income.

Current state of play

- **Boko Haram** and **ISWAP** are both based in Borno State, North-East Nigeria, where they have been fighting each other for control. Borno State is strategically important because it allows for the conduct of operations in Chad, Cameroon and Niger.
- Boko Haram is thought to have been weakened by its struggle for influence with ISWAP, but nonetheless, in recent months it has staged a series of attacks in Borno State. The exact strength of the group was the subject of a political spat between the local and the federal authorities.
 - On 9 April Borno State governor Babagana Zulum said that Boko Haram was making a comeback, a statement that was immediately refuted by the federal government.
 - This was in turn contradicted by former Senate Leader Mohammed Ali Ndume, who claimed that Boko Haram controls three LGAs in Borno State: Gudumbari, Marte and Abadam.
- ISWAP, meanwhile, was very active in the first few months of 2025, also in Borno State.
 - On 2 April an ISWAP attack on a military base resulted in the death of 12 Cameroonian soldiers operating as part of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF, comprising soldiers from Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria). ISWAP used drones to gather intelligence before launching a ground invasion of the base.
 - Another high-profile ISWAP operation was a failed attempt in March to ambush a convoy carrying the Borno State governor; the governor's security detail successfully repelled the attack.
- **Ansaru** is based in Kaduna State and is also strong in Kano State. It appears to have downscaled its activities but is reportedly moving further into the North-West, where there is widespread banditry and economic hardship. This westward move puts it in a position to link up with foreign groups operating in West Africa.
- **Lakurawa** appears to be operating primarily in Kebbi State. The authorities believe that this group will be easily crushed, but since the high-profile attack in November 2024 that brought it to prominence, the group does not appear to have weakened.
 - On 6 April, a large Lakurawa group attacked a village in Augie LG, in Kebbi State, seemingly with the initial intention of stealing the village cattle. However, a group of village vigilantes intercepted them and in the ensuing fight, 16 of them were killed.



Kidnapping and extortion: overview



Perpetrators

- Armed bandit groups across the country and petty criminals are the main perpetrators of kidnap strictly for ransom. Extortion is another key source of revenue for both these groups.
- High inflation and rising poverty are fuelling abduction rates, driving increasing numbers of predominantly young men to resort to kidnapping.
- Since around 2020, there has been a surge in kidnap for ransom by herdsmen, although in early 2025 mass abductions in rural areas appeared to have declined relative to 2024.
- Religious groups engage in kidnapping for both financial and political purposes. This is especially true when groups lose control of territory, as ransoms replace the lost revenue derived from controlling villages and farms.



Targets

- Victims of kidnap for ransom are overwhelmingly local inhabitants, especially in rural areas where mass kidnappings have become the norm.
- Foreigners are estimated to account for only around 1% of cases, according to various non-official sources and Convex's own estimates.
- Foreigners are targets of kidnap-for-ransom mainly in the oil-rich Niger Delta. However, in less developed areas of the country foreigners working for non-governmental organisations (NGO) or other humanitarian agencies can also be targets of kidnapping, not only for ransom but also for political reasons.



Statistics

- Crime statistics made available by the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) on its website are not comprehensive or up to date.
- A public domain source often used in reports of crime in Nigeria is the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), a US-based NGO.
- The data available suffer from limitations and almost certainly fail to reflect real levels; for example, many instances of kidnap happen in rural areas and are not reported.

If you would like to discuss this or how Convex Crisis Response can support you, contact your broker, agent or Convex Crisis Response on:
crisisresponsemanagement@convexin.com



Principles of security

There are seven fundamental principles of security:




Layers of security



Planning



Communication



Situational awareness



Profile



Routine



Information security

These principles are applicable in any environment, however they are most relevant in unfamiliar surroundings or in areas with high levels of crime, terrorism or civil unrest. In terms of kidnap prevention, experience shows that given the relatively opportunistic nature of many kidnaps adherence to these principles can reduce the likelihood of someone becoming a victim of kidnapping.

- **Layers of security:** there is no single measure that enhances personal security, instead the focus should always be on applying several layers of mitigation involving physical, procedural and behavioural measures, as well as adopting a generally proactive attitude towards security.
- **Planning:** individuals can reduce risk simply by making an effort to understand the general security environment in their location and then pre planning appropriate security precautions (for example insurance, airport pick-ups, security escorts and/or other local support).
- **Communications:** identifying in advance key points of contact in emergencies (for example local office, hotel, police, embassy, security providers) and have a back-up method of communications in the event a phone does not work locally for network or other reasons. In higher threat environments share itineraries with others in advance and consider establishing lost contact plans involving periodic 'check ins'.
- **Situational awareness:** being aware of your general surroundings at all times but particularly with regards regular routines (for example arriving or leaving at home, the office, schools, or restaurants or shopping malls). Be aware of higher risk areas along routes you travel and be alert to unusual or suspicious incidents, behaviours, people or other occurrences in your vicinity. Avoid situations where you could become isolated and, above all, always trust your instincts.
- **Profile:** kidnappers – and criminals in general – normally target their victims because that individual has come to their attention for some reason. It is therefore important that individuals adopt a low profile in high kidnap threat environments. This should involve minimising overt displays of wealth, not unnecessarily sharing unnecessarily details of itineraries or business trips, and ensuring personal information such as home addresses, phone numbers and email address and family information are not easily accessible.
- **Routines:** kidnappers are most easily able to target and abduct victims who have a predictable routine. It is important therefore in higher threat kidnap environments to avoid setting predictable patterns of behaviour, particularly regarding places you regularly visit. Most kidnaps occur at the beginning or end of journeys, so it is critical to be alert during these phases.
- **Information security:** to reduce vulnerability to both kidnapping but also extortion it is important individuals and their families regularly undertake periodic reviews of their online profiles – including all corporate and social media – to enable an assessment of what personal information is easily accessible and could be utilised by criminals.

Kidnap and Extortion

INITIAL ACTIONS

IF YOU SUSPECT YOU ARE THE VICTIM OF A KIDNAP OR THREAT EXTORTION

DO

- ✓ Start a log of calls, events and any actions taken
- ✓ Form a small family crisis cell / company crisis team
- ✓ Preserve any physical evidence carefully (e.g. letters or parcels received)
- ✓ If possible record any telecommunications with the kidnapper/extortionist, or carefully note all details of what is said
- ✓ Note details of all demands, deadlines or threats received
- ✓ **If you are a Convex client call the 24/7 Response Helpline and ask to speak to the Convex Crisis Response Duty officer**

DON'T

- ✗ Agree to anything, make any offer or start negotiating
- ✗ Acknowledge, agree to or self-impose any deadlines (e.g. "I can get that for you in an hour")
- ✗ Discuss the incident with anyone who does not need to know about it or, if it is not yet publicly known, report the incident without first receiving advice
- ✗ Make any decisions until advised by Convex Crisis Response.

If a kidnapping

Prepare for a possible first call from the kidnappers by:

- Identifying someone (not a decision maker) to act as a 'Communicator' to speak on behalf of the family/company
- Identifying anyone who could potentially receive a call from kidnappers and brief them on how to respond if they are contacted (to say and promise nothing and direct the caller to the Communicator's number).

If communication from someone claiming to hold the victim is received the Communicator should:

- Listen carefully to what is said and ask the caller to repeat anything that is unclear
- Reassure the caller you wish to cooperate
- Explain that you are not authorized to make any decisions as you have to consult other family or company members
- Ask to speak with the victim to confirm that they are alive and well, or ask for other evidence of their well-being (e.g. the answer to a question that only the victim(s) can answer)
- If you do speak with the victim(s) reassure them you are doing everything you can to secure their release and that their family(s) are being looked after
- Stay calm in the face of threats, these are normal, but challenge threats of violence towards the victim(s) (e.g. 'We want to resolve this without anyone getting hurt')
- If possible arrange a time for a call back
- Stall for time pending the arrival of the Convex Crisis Response consultant.



REMEMBER

If in doubt call the Convex Crisis Response Helpline – we would rather help you prevent an incident than help you respond to one.





Convex Insurance UK Limited

52 Lime Street, London EC3M 7AF
+44 (0)20 3886 0560

Convex Re Limited

Point House, 6 Front Street, Hamilton HM 11, Bermuda
+1 441 232 0112

Convex Europe S.A.

37 Boulevard Joseph II, 2ème étage,
L-1840 Luxembourg, Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg
+352 27 86 22 76

Convex Guernsey Limited

Bucktrout House, Glatigny Esplanade, St Peter Port, Guernsey, GY1 1WR

convexin.com

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